Original English interview with Sasa Post, to be published in Arabic on their website:
Q.Two stories about you were published in major international media outlets (Foreign Policy and New York Times) in less than 24 hours. Do you think that this interest in your ideology and activism is sudden?
A.What is surprising to me is that the attention is being focused on me personally. It is impossible to quantify any influence my ideas may or may not have on the strategies of activists on the ground. I think the trend is important, the movement of the revolution to include corporate power as a factor in the Coup; and I think that deserves to be written about and reported on. As even the alarmist Foreign Policy article mentioned, the ideas that I am talking about are not something unheard of in Egypt; there is no reason to suppose that revolutionaries have not simply reached some of the same conclusions I have reached, without ever reading my writing.
To some extent, I suppose the kind of hysterical reaction of the Egyptian media recently probably had something to do with the focus on me. Also, I did list the Twitter handle of the New York Times bureau chief on a post suggesting that people should contact the international media to express their disapproval of the March Economic Summit. Maybe I came to their attention through that.
Of course, I know that my own history is probably a factor in this as well. The tragic nightmare of everything that happened in the UAE, the scandalous coverage by the state media, the fact that I am an American, etc; I guess it caters to the popular appetite for media created character-based narratives.
Q. You criticized Foreign Policy’s story for containing “a lot of inaccuracies and vitriol, guesswork and reliance on unreliable information,” and said New York Time’s story was “more objective,” but “not entirely accurate.” How did you read these stories? And apart from linking your writing to “inciting violence” that you consistently deny, what sort of “inaccuracies” or “unreliable information” you would like to correct?
A. The Foreign Policy article was just a joke. This is supposed to be a well-researched study, but somehow the authors could not figure out how to contact me? There are really too many problems with the article than I can list here.
The main point is the mistake about inciting violence. I have never written anything that encourages or approves of bloodshed. It is completely inaccurate to imply that I incite violence, while I am actually trying to suggest alternatives to violence. The most radical things I have proposed are to block traffic, or to block drainage for factories, etc. Very low-scale nonviolent disruption to the operations of multinational companies, which would cause no harm to human life. The tactics I have suggested are inspired by the early labor movement in the US, the concept of “monkey-wrenching”, and so on.
There is also an implication that I am somehow directing rebels on the ground, which, again, is completely inaccurate. I have no direct contact with any groups or factions, nor do I belong to any group. In fact, if you see the recommendations I have actually made, not a single one of them has ever been implemented, as far as I know. The hashtag “your interests are threatened” was created, I think, by the Loser’s Conference page, and I don’t know if I ever used it myself. I never suggested targeting KFC or Vodafone, or any of other sites that rebels have struck, and I only wrote about those companies after rebels targeted them, to give readers an idea of the corporate ownership chains.
What has happened is that rebels have reached the conclusion that multinationals and foreign investors are a major component of the power structure, and they have decided to target them using methods and tactics of their own devising.
Now, it is possible that my writing has helped them reach this conclusion about big business, but that is unquantifiable. Statistically, the majority of Egyptians are anti-neoliberal; they did not take that position from me, but from their own experience.
Q. Your bio says that you are the Chief Analyst for the Global Anti-Aggression Campaign, also known as Qawim, whose website is currently unavailable. How would you like to introduce Shahid Bolsen and Qawim to the Arabic audience?
A. Yes, I believe the website is under construction. Honestly, I am not a spokesperson for the organization, so I am not really the right person to represent it. It was formed in response to the wars of aggression being waged against the Muslim world under the auspices of the “Global War on Terror”. It is dedicated to raising awareness about issues and instances of aggression and trying to support those in civil society who are resisting aggression in all its forms.
As for introducing myself, frankly, I am not really relevant. The only thing that matters is if my ideas and analysis are useful or not. I hope we can become focused on ideas more than on individuals.
Q. Many Egyptians, and certainly the Egyptian government, are suspicious about non-Egyptians who discuss (or as they call it “intervene in”) Egypt’s politics. Are you specifically focused on Egypt’s politics? And if yes, why?
A. Well, Egypt is an enormously important country for the Muslim world. It is important to us for some of the same reasons it is important to international capital; which way Egypt goes, the rest of the region is likely to go.
As was detailed brilliantly by Naomi Klein in her book “the Shock Doctrine”, the neoliberal program benefits from the creation of crisis. Under these sorts of conditions, policies can be pushed through which people would otherwise reject, and yes, that is exactly what is happening in Egypt now. On the other hand, the same conditions can also create a kind of momentum and urgency for activists to organize and confront the power structure more actively than they might do when there is normalcy.
The danger is that, without an effective strategy, and a positive channel for rebels to direct their anger and energy, under crisis conditions, people may become radicalized and turn to violence. This is something I have been warning about for more than a year, and trying to prevent.
Q. Are you officially involved with any Egyptian party, organization or political group? Have any of them contacted you or Qawim?
A.No. I have no affiliation with any party or group. In fact, I am more or less against the idea of parties and groups, as I have written about frequently. As far as I know, there has been no contact between Qawim and any party
Q. Why do you think your writings are gaining popularity among anti-coup Egyptian youth? And what are you aiming to contribute to the current political arena in the Middle East?
A. Again, the popularity of my writing is unquantifiable. Social media is kind of an alternate universe, wher “likes” and “shares” and this sort of thing equate popularity; but that is extremely different from real life grassroots organizing and support-building.
I think that, if revolutionaries are moving in a direction towards confronting corporate power (and multinationals are the largest non-state actors on the global scene), it is the result of many factors. The failure of the traditional Islamist parties to come up with an effective strategy to reverse the Coup; the disconnect between party leaders and their members, due to being either in jail or in exile, I think, has forced rebels to be more independent and creative in their thinking and in their actions; and of course just living every day under the neoliberal policies Sisi is implementing; all of these things are probably factors that have affected the way the revolutionaries operate.
In terms of the contribution I hope to make; well, I have always sought to prevent Egypt becoming a situation like Syria. I have tried to avert civil war. I hope to contribute to breaking the mentality that there is only one way to fight, the idea that fighting must be bloody. Our strategies are so often reactionary and reflexive, and we do not think critically or objectively. We operate under a lot of unquestioned assumptions, and this undermines our effectiveness. I hope I can contribute in some way to the process of ridding ourselves of these intellectual handicaps.
Q. You make it clear through your writings that the “neoliberal program” is the real problem in Egypt and the world. However, both Sisi (the Egyptian Army) and Morsi (the Muslim Brotherhood) do not “oppose the neoliberal economic agenda.” What can the Egyptian youth do in order to confront this agenda?
A. Yes, it is true, the leadership of the Brotherhood is basically neoliberal. I don’t know if they reached that position through analysis, or just by default, since it is the prevailing economic theory today. I have written a good deal about the fact that the actual economic policies in Egypt have not changed over the course of four governments and two revolutions. The only thing that changed under Sisi is that the neoliberal process accelerated. This is the main reason I am always emphasizing policies not personalities; and this is something I hope the revolutionaries will focus on.
Rebels need to establish a method of imposing accountability on corporate power, commandeering their influence, democratizing corporate influence, so that it can become possible to reclaim economic sovereignty and political independence. Rebels should raise awareness about specific unjust and exploitative polices, and propose alternatives. I have never said that multinationals should be forced out of the country, but they should be forced out of state policymaking. If rebels focus on policies instead of personalities, and instead of parties, I think it could be possible to eventually establish regulations on corporate activities and protect the economy, similar to what happened in Ecuador under Rafael Correa, perhaps.