I have mentioned before the innovative tactics of Michael Collins and the early IRA. The important point was the emphasis on an objective evaluation of your enemy’s most vital tools, vulnerabilities, and operational dynamics.
The development of a limited, focused, and creative armed struggle in Ireland based on this analytic method proved astonishingly successful.
Tactics should never be based on assumptions about your enemy. You must thoroughly map and study their system first, and determine your strategy based on what you learn.
In Egypt, if armed struggle is useful (and this is not a foregone conclusion), it must be undertaken in this analytic manner. Don’t assume that it is effective to carry out guerrilla-style attacks on the military and police; don’t assume that it is useful to target government officials or foreign diplomats; don’t assume that attacks on oil facilities or ports or luxury hotels and resorts or disrupting vessels in the Suez Canal, are effective. Don’t assume anything. Research, study, and analyze.
Collins determined that the most effective strategy was to target intelligence officers and their civilian informants, as well as to deploy small mobile brigades of soldiers throughout the country to attack British military convoys and camps. This latter tactic was primarily useful because the British were occupiers and could be driven out. This does not apply to the situation in Egypt. The Egyptian army cannot withdraw. Indeed, this tactic would likely have an opposite result.
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