To be published in Arabic for Arabi21
Violent revolution, armed opposition, carries an inherent handicap that undermines, from the very beginning, its goal of liberation, insofar as it depends heavily on foreign sponsorship, Any armed struggle requires, obviously, weapons, ammunition, and training; this need puts the revolutionary movement in an immediately compromised position vis-à-vis those who arm and train them.
Adopting violent tactics inevitably subordinates the original revolutionary goals to the agendas of the international sponsors who fund the armed factions, converting them, albeit subtly, from an indigenous movement into a militia serving the interests of foreign masters.
These masters may be states, or may be affluent individuals, or they may be intelligence agencies or brokers for arms dealers; whatever the case may be, they are not the local population, and their interests are unlikely to coincide with the interests of the people in the long-term.
The armed revolution in Cuba, for example, or the Sandinistas in Nicaragua, placed those movements squarely under the thumb of the Soviet Union.
The jihadi groups in Syria are struggling with this situation right now . Rich donors from the Gulf are financing jihad ostensibly to establish an Islamic state in Syria, while conspicuously not pursuing this same goal in their home countries.
They are spending millions of dollars to supply mujahideen with missiles and rocket launchers and small arms, and it should be clear that this is, essentially, an investment strategy to create opportunities in Syria for seizing control of fertile agricultural land at drastically reduced prices, monopolize infrastructure and construction contracts, dominate the energy sector, and establish a strong foothold in the eventual revival of tourism.
The Gulf countries are also, of course, concerned about containing the regional political and economic influence of Turkey. Owning the armed factions that may eventually become political players in Syria will ensure Gulf supremacy in the decision-making process within the mini-states that will emerge once Syria is partitioned. It is also quite plausible that these same rich donors own shares in companies like Raytheon and Lockheed, and are therefore earning substantial dividends from the continuous climb in share values precipitated by the war. We can’t know for sure, because, obviously there is no transparency in these matters in Gulf countries.
It is clear that there has been support for the mujahideen at the governmental level, particularly from Saudi Arabia, and this further reveals that the motives for this support have nothing to do with religion, as the Saudis, and other Gulf states, are the declared enemies of political Islam, and have been the major sponsors of the coup in Egypt. The long-term agendas of the sponsors do not coincide with the agendas of the mujahideen who rely on their support.
Western support for jihad in Syria is even more treacherous, and not much really needs to be said about that.
The nature of the struggle of armed groups prevents them from dealing with long-term planning. They are in day-to-day battles, and dealing with the immediacy of their need for constant re-supply of weapons and ammunition and other resources. Following the trail of bullets that leads they know not where.
Nonviolent struggle, even if it incorporates precisely targeted armed operations, does not require foreign sponsors, it does not need continuous funding and equipment; it can be genuinely independent and maintain continuity between revolutionary goals and strategies; it preserves its domestic integrity as an indigenous movement under popular control .