When South Sudan was created, #Sudan lost at least 20% of its GDP because oil revenues had become the cornerstone of country’s economy since 1999, and most of the oil is located in the south. Between 1999 and 2011, Sudan relied heavily on oil revenues, to the detriment of other sectors.
Oil accounted for 90% of Sudan’s exports over the first decade of the 2000s until the independence of South Sudan. It can be argued that the government was irresponsible for concentrating so disproportionately on oil revenues, for not working to diversify the economy; but what oil producing country is any different? When you have oil, you tend to focus on it, and to view other economic sectors as secondary. You develop petroleum related industries and neglect everything else; it is a mistake, but it is a common one.
Now, Sudan has endured eight years of economic trauma; the chance to direct oil revenues to build other sectors of the economy is gone; so every sector is suffering. Sudan is in debt and has few options for recovery. One thing is clear, and that is that Austerity does not help. Austerity hasn’t helped anywhere. But when you are in debt, you follow the advice of your creditor because you assume they want to be paid back and are giving you advice that will actually help you to do that. Unfortunately, Sudan’s creditors are not very interested in repayment, they are interested in servitude. The economic programs they dictate are designed to perpetuate Sudan’s dependence and vulnerability; and they have the leverage to guarantee compliance.
I do not defend Omar Al Bashir or his government; but I do recognise that any government in Sudan will have to contend with a dire economic situation, and I do not see that a revolution or a coup provides a viable solution. Toppling the government may create a euphoria based on the false premise that the strangulation of Sudan’s economy was all the fault of Al Bashir, and will end with his departure. This is clearly inaccurate.
I have seen arguments by some suggesting that Sudan’s economy can be sustained by overseas remittances during any transition of power crisis that would ensue after the regime is toppled. Overseas remittances to Sudan average less than half a billion dollars per year. Or they have said that Al Bashir’s removal from power will immediately boost investor confidence and FDI will stream into Sudan as never before; as if stability is not a factor in investor confidence.
My point here is that the opposition, from what I have seen, has no idea how to solve any of Sudan’s problems. I have been told by some that this is irrelevant; that it is not their role to solve the problems; it is only their role to topple Al Bashir, and thus open the door for the problems to eventually be solved by future generations. This is not a unique rationale, by the way; I heard the same thing from Egyptian, Libyan, and Syrian revolutionaries. It is the “you have to break some eggs if you want to make an omelet” theory of political change. Aside from being monumentally irresponsible, this notion ignores the reality that Sudan (like Libya, Egypt, and Syria) does not exist in a vacuum that would allow a power vacuum within Sudan to exist for any length of time. If you believe that Sudan will be left alone, given a timeout from the global marketplace and from the perpetual competition for resources so the country can become strong, healthy and independent; you have not been paying attention.
Now, I have also been told that it is not sufficient for me to say “don’t topple the government”; that I must also prescribe an effective strategy for positive change in Sudan. I would argue that this isn’t true. I can certainly try to talk someone out of committing suicide without offering them a plan for how to manage their life. I can warn someone not to throw their child into a pool of piranhas and not offer any further parenting advice; just, you know, don’t kill your children; that much I can tell you.
But it does seem to me that, if you want a genuinely positive change in Sudan (or anywhere else, for that matter), you need to address specific government policies, not government personnel. And you need to develop an alternative set of policies that you can then demand. If you believe that you can force the government itself to topple, you certainly should believe that you can force the government to bend.
#SudanUprising