To be published in Arabic for Arabi 21:
Two years after the coup in Egypt, the resistance movement grows both weaker and more frustrated as demonstrations (almost the only tactic advocated by the main coalition of opposition parties) have become increasingly futile. This frustration is causing some, perhaps many, in the resistance to turn favorably towards the likes of ISIS and their franchise in Sinai. Even the rhetoric of some of the large Islamist parties seems to be implying a possible shift towards armed opposition.
There is a popular axiom which states that what has been taken by force can only be taken back by force. If this axiom is true, then statistical data about revolutionary movements over the past 100 years must cause us to redefine what we mean by “force”.
An important book on the effectiveness of strategic nonviolence was published in 2011, and should be required reading for any revolutionary leaders who seek to develop a successful strategy against repressive regimes.
Why Civil Resistance Works: The Strategic Logic of Nonviolent Conflict, by Erica Chenoweth and Maria J. Stephan is the most comprehensive and scientific evaluation to date analyzing the comparative successfulness of nonviolent versus armed resistance movements around the world.
After assessing over 300 resistance campaigns, the authors argue convincingly that from 1900 to 2006, major nonviolent resistance campaigns seeking to overthrow dictatorships, throw out foreign occupations, or achieve self-determination were more than twice as successful as violent insurgencies seeking the same goals.
Nonviolent movements always enjoy greater, and more diverse, popular participation than violent struggles; and this is an essential element for successfully toppling an authoritarian regime.
Even the Iranian revolution, which many today regard as a useful model for the Egyptian rebel movement, was almost entirely nonviolent, and was based on a broad cross-section of political factions, including religious conservatives, Marxists, and constitutional liberals. The Iranian revolutionary leadership sought defections from the security forces, not their assassinations.
As soon as a popular revolutionary movement transforms into an armed insurrection, its likelihood of success immediately plummets. This is not an opinion; it is an historical, empirical fact.
However, of course, nonviolent resistance includes dozens, if not hundreds of tactical options, and it requires a great degree of creativity and strategic thinking on the part of revolutionary leadership.
To simply rely upon mass demonstrations in public squares, while experience has proved the futility of such actions, represents a failure of leadership planning, not a failure of nonviolent strategy itself.
Nonviolent resistance includes demonstrations, labor strikes, work slowdowns, boycotts, obstruction of roads and facilities, etc, etc.
In a situation like Egypt, where foreign investors and multinational corporations have clearly subordinated the regime, and in fact rule the county, if nonviolent tactics (meaning disruption without bloodshed), were directed at corporate targets to cause loss in profitability and operational efficiency, it is predictable that such a campaign could achieve success.
For example, in the Iranian revolution, among the most effective tactics were the labor strikes and slowdowns of oil workers. Disruption to this sector in Egypt would have tremendous impact. Furthermore, disruption of ports and commercial transport, interfering with the supply chain of multinational corporations who use Egypt as a logistical hub for moving goods in and out of North Africa, could be enough to cause the regime to lose international backing.
Nonviolent strategy does not have to mean sending revolutionary youth out to be jailed or slaughtered. There are many options available which can both strike a blow against the regime, and increase popular support for the resistance struggle, while still protecting the lives of activists.