(to be published in Arabic for Arabi21)
It seems that the two biggest unlearned lessons of 2011 are that shouting didn’t get rid of Mubarak, and that getting rid of Mubarak didn’t change the power structure. The fact that these two lessons appear to have completely missed many people in Egypt, and nearly all of the revolutionary opposition parties more or less dooms any program for real change in the country.
Whatever myths may still persist in the minds of the people, what took place in Egypt between 2011 and 2013 on the governmental level, was a fully managed transfer of power. Nobody was toppled by popular uprising; neither Mubarak nor Mursi. Both men were removed by the consensus of the real existing power structure: the international business community and the Egyptian army.
The planned protests for November 11th seem likely, if anything is going to happen at all, to be a repetition of the conventional style of demonstrations, precisely because these lessons have not been learned. Even if the Egyptian people still choose to believe that filling Tahrir Square is the magic formula for making a tyrant disappear, they should surely know by now that making a tyrant disappear does not make tyranny disappear. But, again, they seem to stubbornly miss this point, although I can’t think of anyone for whom the point has been so explicitly illustrated more than for the people of Egypt.
Shuffling dictators is not difficult for the power structure, and keeping the people focused on disposable dictators is quite a useful thing. Real authority resides outside of the government, in the private sector, and in the army, so if popular discontent can be directed towards the government, instead of towards the real authority, it can be easily managed. Democracy is the ideal management system for popular unrest. The people can busy themselves with changing rulers, blaming them for whatever they suffer, and then thinking things will change when they replace him with someone else. But, of course, things do not change; an d things do not change because you have dictators who do not actually dictate, but rather who take dictation, and the ones from whom they take dictation are completely ignored and untouched by popular uprisings against the government.
It is entirely possible that the international business community would like to see a shuffling of dictators in Egypt. The implementation of the IMF Austerity program is going to be difficult, and it can usually be best imposed during moments of crisis and turmoil, that is the basic formula of “the Shock Doctrine”, as articulated by Naomi Klein, deduced from several historical examples. Sisi has implemented most of the reforms demanded by the IMF, and perhaps it is best for him to be sacrificed to appease public anger. The new ruler will, of course, continue with IMF program, but no one will notice, because they will be so happy to see the end of Sisi.
This is why genuine revolutions focus on policies, not on personages. And that is why genuine revolutions direct their actions against the real forces of power and control. And this is why I am not particularly optimistic about the prospects for 11/11; it is why I am, in fact, somewhat suspicious about the entire 11/11 movement and the Ghalabah Party. Anyone with an even moderate level of political awareness will understand that the removal of Sisi will not change policy; so if they are insisting that it will, they are either fantastically ignorant or they are liars; and in either case, it is likely that they are being used as instruments by those who do understand that removing Sisi will not change policy.
This does not mean that 11/11 cannot succeed. But in order for it to succeed, the style of protest will have to be radically different from what we have seen in the past. It will have to be a style of protest that is not based upon the myths of 2011. Protest will have to be directed as the real institutions of power, it will have to be disruptive, and it will have to be based on policy demands. Unfortunately, however, there is very little indication that any of these criteria are going to be met. 11/11 may well give Egypt a replay of 2011, and this will mean, essentially, a repeat of the same process of 2011-2013; a managed transfer of power which keeps policy intact, and the power structure untouched.